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2. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
COMPETITION POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM THE
TURKISH CEMENT INDUSTRY
2.1 Introduction
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Turkey has sought to become a
member of the European Union (then the European Economic Community). During
this mostly disappointing and as yet unfinished process, Turkey has adopted many
economic (like customs union) and political (like human rights issues) laws, rules,
and practices of the European Union. The most important economic adoption,
though, was the passage of the Law on the Protection of Competition in the Turkish
Parliament in 1994. As a consequence of the Law, the Competition Authority, which
is the body responsible for applying the Law, was established in 1997.
In this study we investigate whether the implementation of the Law on the Pro-
tection of Competition in Turkey has really been effective. For that purpose, we
select the cement industry for investigation. The cement industry is important for
a couple of reasons. First of all, Turkey is one of the largest cement producers in
the world and the largest in Europe. Obviously, the cement industry is a very im-
portant industry for Turkey. Secondly, the cement industry has been in the focus of
the Competition Authority since it was established in 1997 and many cement plants
have been subject to investigations. As a result, we expect to see the effects of these
investigations, if any, in our data. Thirdly, cement’s physical characteristics makes it
mostly a domestic product since its value to weight ratio is low. This characteristic
makes us free of international trade and import competition considerations and lets
us focus on the domestic market. Finally, we have a unique industry-level data base
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of prices, production, domestic sales, export, import, and input prices of all of the
Turkish cement producers, compiled from their annual reports, some governmental
sources, and various databases, spanning from the late 1970s to 2002. The richness
of the data increases the reliability of our economic analysis. Besides, to the best
of our knowledge, Turkey’s competition policy has not been the subject of any eco-
nomic research up to now. Thus, this is the first study investigating the effectiveness
of competition policy in Turkey.
There are other studies similar in spirit to this one for different countries. For
instance, [22] “investigate the impact of competition policy on the level and the
dynamics of firm price cost margins in two European countries, Belgium and the
Netherlands.”1 [23] makes a similar investigation for the U.S. [24] looks at the price-
cost margins in the U.S. manufacturing and aims to detect the relation between
these margins and the toughness of antitrust policy. Unlike these studies, we focus
on only one sector. Because we think that effects of competition policy might not be
felt evenly in every sector in a country. Some sectors are more important or strategic
than others and keeping a healthy competition in those sectors might be a priority.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly looks at the current compe-
tition policy in Turkey. Section 3 draws a relatively detailed portrait of the Turkish
cement industry. Section 4 develops the econometric model based on the New Em-
pirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) framework. Section 5 discusses the data we
use. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes. Appendix A explains in
detail the data we use. Appendix B contains the most relevant articles of the Law
on the Protection of Competition.
2.2 Competition Policy in Turkey
Competition policy in Turkey began in 1994 with the passage of the Law on the
Protection of Competition, Law No. 4054, by the Turkish Parliament2. Article 167
1 [22], p. 841.
2For an extensive survey and assessment of Turkey’s competition policy experience, see [25].
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of the Turkish Constitution attributed to the government the duty and the respon-
sibility to take measures to provide and improve healthy and regular procedures in
money, credit, capital, product, and services markets and to prevent monopolization
and cartelization as a result of any activity or agreement in these markets. But there
was no separate body in Turkey directly responsible for applying Article 167 until
1997 nor was there a separate law until 1994.
In 1997, three years after the passage of the Law, the Competition Authority was
established. The Competition Authority is the body responsible for applying the
Law. The implementation of the Law by the Competition Authority can be broadly
summarized in three categories: competition infringement, negative clearance and
exemption, and mergers and acquisitions.
2.2.1 Competition Infringement
The relevant articles here are Article 4 and Article 6 of the Law.3 Article 4 aims
to prevent the distortion of competition by collusive behavior in the form of decisions,
agreements, or concerted practices between undertakings in a certain market of goods
or services. Article 4 is similar in nature to Article 85, Paragraph 1 of the 1957 Treaty
of Rome4. Article 6 aims to prevent the abuse of a dominant position by undertakings
which have a dominant position in a certain market of goods or services. Article 6
is similar to Article 86 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome5.
If it is thought that any of these articles has been infringed, either upon appli-
cation by a third party or on its own initiative, the Competition Authority applies
Article 40, which basically calls for either a preliminary inquiry in order to decide
whether it is necessary to initiate an investigation or for moving directly to an in-
vestigation. If the Competition Authority decides that an infringement exists, then
it imposes fines based on Article 16 of the Law.
3All the relevant articles are in Appendix B.
4The paragraphs of the EU Treaty have been renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam. So Article
85, Paragraph 1 is now Article 81, Paragraph 1, but the substance of the Article is unchanged.
5Now Article 82
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2.2.2 Negative Clearance and Exemption
Article 5 of the Law provides for exemptions to Article 4. Under this article, even
if there exists an agreement, concerted practice, or decision which restricts competi-
tion, the Competition Authority may declare an exemption from the application of
Article 4 upon the application of the parties concerned and if certain conditions are
met. These conditions include agreements, concerted practices and decisions which
allow consumers to share from the resulting benefit, contribute to new developments
and progress or technical or economic improvement in production or distribution of
goods and in providing services, which do not eliminate competition in a substantial
part of the relevant market and do not induce a restraint on competition that is
more than essential to obtain the resulting benefits. Article 4 is similar in nature to
Article 85, Paragraph 2 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
2.2.3 Mergers and Acquisitions
Article 7 states that mergers of two or more undertakings and acquisitions of
one undertaking by another undertaking or by a person, except acquisition by way
of inheritance, either by acquisition of all or part of its assets or securities or by
other means is unlawful and prohibited if it creates or strengthens the dominant
position of one or more undertakings and as a result of which competition is signif-
icantly impeded in the relevant market in the whole or part of the territory of the
State. Mergers and acquisitions require prior notification to and permission by the
Competition Authority in order to be considered as legally valid.
Thus, Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 altogether define the essence of Turkish competition
policy. The Competition Authority’s role is important here because it has both
investigation and jurisdiction power. Firms can, however, appeal its decisions to the
Council of Appeals.
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2.3 The Turkish Cement Industry
2.3.1 Cement and Its Characteristics
Cement is a hydraulic binder produced by grinding clinker, which is obtained
as a result of the burning of raw materials containing calcium (limestone), silica,
aluminium oxide, and iron oxide (clay and sand) at high temperatures, with gypsum
in certain amounts. The economic characteristics of cement can be summarized as
follows. On the supply side, the main characteristics are that
• it is an intermediate (producer) good,
• its production requires high investments (large fixed costs, mainly plant costs),
• there are scale economies in its production,
• long term storage, which is costly, is not economically feasible6, and
• its value-to-weight ratio is low, which is why surface transportation is costly and
shipment to destinations further than 200 kilometers by land is not economical.
On the demand side, the main characteristics of cement are that
• it is homogenous,
• its price elasticity of demand is low because it has no close substitutes7,
• its demand is geographically dispersed and corresponds to the population den-
sity, and
• its demand is seasonal as a result of changes in construction activities.
6It is not possible to store cement for long periods. Stocks are usually in the form of clinker.
However, clinker is also not storable for a long time.
7There are three possible substitutes for cement: asphalt in road construction and steel and wood
in building construction. However, steel and wood are not legitimate substitutes for cement in
Turkey due to their high costs.
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Table 2.1
10 Biggest Cement Producers (Million Tons)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
China 475.6 491.2 511.7 536.0 573.0
Japan 90.5 94.5 91.9 81.3 80.1
India 67.7 73.3 82.9 87.6 100.2
U.S. 76.9 79.3 82.6 83.9 86.0
S. Korea 56.1 58.4 60.3 46.8 48.6
Germany 38.9 37.0 37.2 38.5 38.1
Brazil 28.3 34.6 38.0 39.9 40.2
Turkey 33.2 35.2 36.0 38.2 34.3
Italy 33.7 33.3 33.7 35.5 36.8
Thailand 34.1 38.7 37.1 22.7 25.4
Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook
Turkey is one of the biggest cement producers in the world8. Table 2.1 shows
the 10 biggest cement producers for the 1995-1999 period sorted by the magnitude
of their average production for the period. As can be seen, Turkey is always one of
the 10 biggest producers in the world and one of the 3 biggest in Europe.
Cement production has a long history in Turkey. The first plant was established
in 1911. However, from 1911 to the early 1950s, cement production was carried
out only by the state. In 1950s, the state launched a series of aids to the private
sector in order to encourage investments in the cement industry. From that time on,
cement plants were established by both the state and the private sector. However,
production was not enough for the domestic demand and cement imports continued
until the 1970s.
8Two factors make Turkey one of the biggest cement producers in the world. First, Turkey is amply
endowed with the raw materials that cement production requires. Second, domestic consumption
is high, usually as high as production. See the next section.
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Fig. 2.1. Production and Domestic Sales of Cement in Turkey
2.3.2 Production, Sales, and Distribution
Figure 2.1 shows production and domestic sales of cement in Turkey. As can be
seen, except for the last few years, most of the cement produced in Turkey is used
within Turkey. Since imports are low and holding stocks is costly, the difference
between production and domestic sales is very close to exports. Unlike the situation
in industrialized countries, the demand is increasing over time. The upward trend is
clearly visible and the peak occurred in 1998. The major earthquake in 1999 and the
economic crisis in the following two years caused the demand to fall. Until 1998, the
trend was encouraging for the entry of new competitors. Between 1978 and 1997, 20
new plants throughout Turkey started to operate and 2 plants exited the industry.
Out of these 20 plants, 7 belonged to new firms entering the market, 6 belonged
to already existing firms, and the other 7 belonged to the state, which eventually
privatized them. Since 1998, no new plants have been established, but one plant
exited the industry.
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The distribution of cement in Turkey is carried out through two channels: either
from plants directly to the final destination or from plants to middlemen, which
distribute cement to the final destination. Among the final destinations of cement are
ready-mixed concrete companies, including the cement companies themselves since
many cement companies also produce ready mixed concrete, construction companies,
and the state. Roughly 60% of total cement sales go to middlemen, 20% to ready-
mixed concrete companies, 10% to construction companies, and 1-2% to the state.
2.3.3 Ownership
Turkey’s cement industry currently consists of 57 cement plants, 39 of which are
integrated cement plants and 18 are grinding-packaging plants9. All of the plants
are in the private sector. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, the plants are homogeneously
distributed all over Turkey, although there is a bit concentration in the northwestern
part. This is to be expected because that part of Turkey has the highest population
density and is the most developed region.
Table 2.2 shows plants and their owners. There are 27 cement companies operat-
ing in Turkey. However, there are strong business ties among some companies and we
include them in groups. For instance, Oyak and Sabancı together have 9 integrated
plants and 4 grinding-packaging mills. Similarly, Yibitas¸ and Lafarge have common
and separate plants. The companies shown in the “Others” section do not belong to
a group. Those in the last 6 rows have only a single grinding mill and are very small
companies. Their annual production is usually less than 100 thousand tons.
9The difference between an integrated plant and a grinding-packaging plant is that an integrated
plant is capable of producing both clinker and cement whereas a grinding-packaging plant buys
clinker from outside sources and produces cement by grinding it. Thus integrated plants have cost
advantage over grinding-packaging plants in cement production.
72
F
ig.
2.2.
C
em
en
t
P
lan
ts
73
Table 2.2
Groups, Companies, and Plants
Companies Integrated Plants Grinding Mills Total
Oyak-Sabancı Group
Oyak 4 1 5
Sabancı + CBR 2 1 3
Sabancı Holding 1 1 2
Oyak + Sabancı (Oysa) 1 1 2
Oyak + GAMA 1 0 1
Rumeli Group
Rumeli 8 1 9
Yibitas-Lafarge Group
Yibitas¸ - Lafarge 2 3 5
Lafarge 1 1 2
Yibitas¸ 1 0 1
Set Group
Set 4 1 5
Others
Batı Anadolu 2 1 3
C¸imentas¸ 2 1 3
Vicat 2 0 2
Nuh Holding 1 0 1
Limak Holding 1 0 1
Go¨ltas¸ 1 0 1
Eskis¸ehir 1 0 1
Bursa 1 0 1
Denizli 1 0 1
Erc¸imsan 1 0 1
C¸imko C¸imento 1 0 1
O¨ztu¨re Kirec¸ 0 1 1
I˙kon A.S. 0 1 1
Marmara 0 1 1
I˙stas¸ 0 1 1
Ado Madencilik 0 1 1
O¨zgu¨r Beton 0 1 1
Total 39 18 57
2.3.4 Capacity
The industry has almost always produced under capacity. Figure 2.3 shows the
total capacity and cement production from 1996 to 2002. As can be seen, cement
production has a clear, albeit gradual, decreasing trend. Nevertheless, the total
capacity shows a clear increasing trend. The result is an increasing trend in excess
capacity. It seems that the plants invested heavily in capacity, especially for the last
6 years. The main reason for the excess capacity is state aids specifically granted
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Fig. 2.3. Excess Capacity in Cement Production
to create new capacity10. In cement production in Turkey, capacity constraints are
more likely to show themselves in clinker production.
2.3.5 Cost Structure
The main cost items in cement production are electricity, fuel (coal and/or oil),
labor, kraft paper for packaging, and raw materials. Table 2.3 shows the main
elements in the cost of cement production in Turkey. As can be seen, the most
important cost item is electricity. Fuel is the second most important cost item. As
a result of the oil crisis in 1970s, coal has replaced oil as the main energy source for
many plants11. Labor costs take the third place. Kraft paper, which is used as the
packaging material in cement production, is the fourth most important cost item.
Although the ratio of bagged cement to bulk cement has somewhat decreased over
10Even the President of the TCMA complained about the situation in an address published in the
Annual Reports of the TCMA. He claimed the state aids should aim at investments for decreasing
costs rather than increasing capacity
11State Planning Institute, Cement and Concrete Report.
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Table 2.3
Cost Items and Their Average Share
Cost Items Average Share in Unit Cost (%)
Electricity 23.5
Fuel (Oil or Coal) 20.0
Labor 14.0
Packaging & Packaging Labor 11.5
Raw Materials 9.5
Total 78.5
Source: State Planning Institute, Cement and Concrete Report
time, it was more than 50% for most of our sample period. That’s why its share in
unit cost cannot be disregarded. We were able to collect price data for kraft paper
long enough to cover the sample period 1986-2002. That’s why we did include it in
our econometric analysis. Unfortunately we were not able to collect price data for
raw materials. However many firms have their own quarries12 but we do not have
detailed information about which firms have their own quarries and which do not. If
most of the firms have their own quarries then including prices of raw materials might
not be a good idea. In short, our econometric specification covers approximately 70%
of the cost items in cement production.
2.3.6 Foreign Trade
The cement industry enjoyed the benefits of tariff protection until the 1980s13.
The 1980s saw Turkey open up its economy. However, the industry started to export
in large amounts only recently. Imports have never been significant14. It is interesting
12Personal interview with an expert in the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
13 [26], p. 275.
14The same is true for the raw materials that cement production requires.
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to observe that the sector exported in large amounts only when the domestic demand
shrank. For instance, the economic crisis of 2001 caused the industry to export
an unprecedented amount of cement. This may show that the domestic market is
profitable enough and producers turn to export only when the domestic demand is
relatively low.
Figure 2.4 shows the cement exports and imports in million tons from 1980 to
2002. As can be seen, the volume of exports were relatively high in 1980s, an era when
Turkey adopted open economy policies for the first time in its history. The 1990s
saw an even greater increase in exports. During this period, the volume of exports
steadily increased, reaching a record level of 6 million tons in 2002, approximately
a quarter of domestic sales. As the figure shows, during 1980s cement imports were
basically zero. Late 1980s and early 1990s saw a little bit of imports. From that
date on, imports were of minor levels. Thus the figure tells that domestic cement
producers in Turkey have never faced serious import competition.
Turkey exports cement to Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
But most of the cement is exported to European Union countries like Italy, Spain,
France, Ireland, and Belgium. U.S. has been the second biggest market for Turkey,
especially for the last few years. Almost all export is carried out by sea. That gives
cement companies that have plants near the coasts an edge. The driving force behind
export is Turkey’s low cement prices, which may be due to low wages and relatively
cheap raw materials. Still another factor may be that they cut their prices15 in world
markets rather than keeping their excess production in stocks. Initially, one of our
explanations behind Turkey’s low cement prices in international markets was some
form of state aids. However, a recent report by the State Institute of Planning claims
that there are no export subsidies in the cement industry16.
15The same price cut may not be likely to invoke the same amount of sales in domestic market
compared to international markets. That may be the reason the cement firms especially turn to
foreign markets when there is recession in the Turkish economy.
16See [27], p. 53.
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Fig. 2.4. Cement Exports and Imports
Note that the fact that some cement firms export does not necessarily mean that
they make profits from it. The real issue for cement firms can be stated as follows.
Firms make production and domestic sale plans at the beginning of each period. If,
for some reason, their plans could not be realized, they find themselves with large
amounts of excess production. At this stage, the behavior of cement firms depends
on their location. Those firms that are close to the coasts turn to exporting. In-land
firms enter other nearby territories. In either case, they cut their prices in order to
sell off their excess production. This may mean that they do not make profits at this
stage. However, their other alternative, keeping excess production in stocks, is either
physically impossible, if their excess production is becoming too large, or too costly
to be feasible. In either case, cutting prices and entering other territories, domestic
or international, seem to be the better choice.
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Table 2.4
Concentration Measures in the Turkish cement industry
Concentration N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
CR4 25 0.25983 0.017955 0.23513 0.29558
CR8 25 0.4375 0.01682 0.40674 0.46992
HHI 25 376.7104 26.225578 328.63 424.06
2.3.7 Concentration
Concentration has been very stable in the industry over the last 25 years17. Table
2.4 shows the various concentration measures and their summary statistics. The four-
firm concentration ratio (CR4) has a mean value of 26%. The standard deviation
is very low, showing that the mean value has not changed much during the last 25
years. The minimum CR4 was around 25.5% in 1987 and the maximum was around
29.5% in 2000. The 8-firm concentration ratio has also been very stable. Over
the last 25 years, its mean value was approximately 44% with a very low standard
deviation. Table 2.4 also shows the the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which
gives a better idea about the overall situation in the industry.
Figure 2.5 shows the 4-firm and 8-firm concentration ratios using production
figures over time. As can be seen, they have not changed much during the 1978-2002
period. However, there is a slight increasing trend for the last 9-10 years. This shows
that the biggest 4 and 8 firms increased their share in total production at the expense
of middle-sized and small-sized firms. The increase in concentration for the last 9-10
years is also apparent in Figure 2.6, which shows HHI over time. The main reasons
for the increase are twofold. First, some small plants, e.g. Gu¨mu¨s¸hane and Stfa
Dogˇal, shut down in the period. Second, the two biggest cement plants, Akc¸imento
and C¸anakkale, merged in 1996, just one year before the Competition Authority
17The concentration figures in this section are plant-level concentrations. We were unable to collect
information on the ownership of all the plants for the entire period.
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Fig. 2.5. 4-Firm and 8-Firm Concentration Ratios between 1978 and 2002
was established. The merged company, Akc¸ansa, produces around 10-15% of total
cement production in Turkey.
The figures indicate that there are around 8-10 big plants producing approxi-
mately half of total cement production in Turkey. The rest, which is around 40
plants, are relatively small and share the other half.
2.3.8 External Shocks
There have been a couple of external shocks to the sector in the near past, which
changed the structure of cement production in Turkey. The earliest one was the
oil crises in the 1970s, which caused many plants to switch from fuel oil to coal18.
Currently most of the plants use coal as fuel source. Another effect of the oil crises
was that most of the plants were transformed to the dry system19. Another negative
18Coal is basically petroleum coke coal, import coal, and lignite in decreasing order of usage.
19There are basically three types of cement production: wet, half-dry, and dry. The dry system is
the most energy efficient.
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Fig. 2.6. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index between 1978 and 2002
shock, which began in 1997, was the Far East Financial Crisis. The shock hit the
Turkish cement industry in 199820.
Earthquakes create negative external shocks to the cement industry all over the
world. The major earthquake in 1999 and its after-shocks, which lasted for weeks,
caused many construction projects to halt. It took months to clear up the devastated
area and the result was a major negative effect on the demand for cement. Finally,
the worst economic crisis in Turkey, which started in late 2000 or early in 2001 and
lasted into 2002, hit the cement industry as well as other industries. For instance,
many sectors experienced negative growth rates in 2002.
The reaction of plants to these external shocks can be divided into two sections.
On the one hand, plants that are close to the coast depended on exports during
difficult times when domestic demand shrank. On the other hand, in-land plants
20Annual Reports of the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
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competed fiercely among each other, entering each other’s territories21. They usually
cut prices in order to sell excess production.
2.3.9 Government Intervention and Privatization
In the past, government intervention in cement industry has taken various forms,
although it has substantially decreased over time. One form of government interven-
tion is state aids aiming at capacity increases22. The main purpose of these state aids
may be a desire to avoid cement imports. The state may want to make sure that the
domestic production is always capable of satisfying domestic demand. Developing
countries like Turkey try to avoid imports because they usually experience financial
instabilities, which result in shortages of foreign currencies like the dollar. Another
possible explanation is the lingering mercantilist view Turkey still has that exports
are good and imports are bad for the country’s economy. This view gained momen-
tum in 1980s when the state started to grant export subsidies in large amounts to
various industries.
A sign of decrease in the scale of government intervention in the industry is priva-
tization, which started in 1989 and ended in 1997. The number of state-owned plants
was 24 in 1988. 5 of them were sold in 1989. The second large-scale privatization oc-
curred in 1992, in which year 7 plants were privatized. The rest, a total of 12 plants,
were sold between 1993 and 1997. Figure 2.7 shows the share of state-owned plants
in total cement production between 1978 and 1998. As can be seen, the state-owned
plants were relatively small and their total share in production was never significant.
For instance, the 24 plants, around two-thirds of the total, produced only a third of
total cement output between 1978 and 1988. Between 1990 and 1994, state shares in
21There are implicitly drawn territories in the cement industry in Turkey. There are seven territo-
ries, which are Aegean, Marmara, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, Eastern Anatolia,
and Southeastern Anatolia, and any plant within a territory primarily aims to sell within it. Of
course, these territories do not necessarily represent economic markets or antitrust markets. How-
ever, the Competition Authority used these territories as the bases for defining geographic markets
in cement investigations.
22See [28], p. 1.
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Fig. 2.7. Share of State-Owned Plants
5 plants, apart from the 24 plants in the privatization program, were sold to private
sector. We exclude them in Figure 2.7 because they were small shares and the state
never had any influence in management.
Privatization also attracted foreign capital into the sector. Currently there are
four foreign firms operating in Turkey: Lafarge Coppee (French), Heidelberger Ze-
ment/CBR (German), Ciment Francais-Italcementi joint venture (Italian-French),
and Ciment Vicat (Belgian). They are among the 10 leading companies in world
cement production.
Another sign of decrease in the scale of government intervention was the relax-
ation of price controls in the industry following the open economy policies adopted
at the beginning of 1980s, which changed the face of cement industry as well as
many other industries. For instance, until 1982, cement prices were determined by
the state23. In 1982, the Ministry of Industry authorized the Turkish Cement Man-
ufacturers’ Association to determine cement prices subject to its approval. Cement
23Annual Reports of the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
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prices were completely set free in December 1985 and have been determined by the
market conditions since then.
2.3.10 Cement Industry Investigations
The cement industry has a rich history of antitrust cases all over the world.
The Turkish cement industry is not an exception. The industry has often been the
subject of investigations by the Competition Authority. These investigations mostly
concerned collusive behavior in the form of price setting in local markets. In the
last few years the cement producers in the Mediterranean, Aegean, Marmara, and
Central Anatolia regions, which produce approximately 75 percent of total cement
production in Turkey, were subject to a series of collusive behavior investigations
and were found guilty and penalized. Other investigations concerned whether some
mergers or acquisitions violate Article 7 of the Law.
The first cement industry investigation by the Competition Authority concerned
5 cement companies operating on the west of Turkey. The plants were Akc¸ansa,
Batıc¸im, Batıso¨ke, C¸imentas¸, and Denizli, whose combined production constituted
around 20-30% of total cement production in Turkey. The complaint was originally
filed by the I˙zmir Trade Chamber to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It
claimed that the cement plants applied parallel prices. On February 21, 1997, the
Ministry decided to convey the complaint to the Competition Authority, which was
not established yet. When the Authority was established later in the same year, the
Board immediately decided to start an initial examination. The initial examination
report suggested the need for a preliminary research and the preliminary research
report suggested an investigation though the research committee was not able to
find any evidence for parallel pricing. The investigation committee determined the
relevant product market to be Portland cement, Portland pozzolana cement, and
Portland limestone cement and determined the relevant geographic market as the
Aegean region, obeying the implicit territorial classification we mentioned earlier.
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Table 2.5
First Investigation and Fines in Dollars
Plant Fines in 1999 Fines in 2002
Baticim 674,454 184,600
Akcansa 609,968 166,950
Cimentas 487,112 133,324
Batisoke 175,008 47,900
Denizli 172,493 47,212
Total 2,119,035 579,986
The investigation committee claimed that the plants determined their annual sales
collusively, shared the relevant geographical market, determined prices outside the
market conditions through continuous meetings, and created an export cartel in
order to keep a certain domestic price level. The Competition Board announced its
decision on June 17, 1999 and penalized the five cement firms. The cement firms
immediately appealed the decision. As of 2002, the case is still pending in the courts.
Table 2.5 shows the firms and the monetary fines. The fines are fixed by the Law
in Turkish Liras in 1999. The second column in the table shows the fines in 1999
dollars and the third column shows them in 2002 dollars. Since the exchange rate of
the dollar to the Turkish Lira increased about 3.5 times between 1999 and 200224,
the real value of the fines substantially decreased. This case is a generic example of
the situation of the implementation of competition policy in Turkey.
The second cement industry investigation, which was decided by the Competition
Authority on its own initiative on June 20, 2000, was much bigger in scale. The
Authority decided to simultaneously investigate the cement plants operating in the
Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean regions. The investigation included
24One dollar was 412,533 TL in June 1999 and 1,507,230 TL in 2002.
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Table 2.6
Second Investigation and Fines in Dollars
Plant Fines
Akcansa 770,772
Set 593,260
Adana 429,760
Cimsa 423,168
Yibitas-Lafarge 328,479
Bolu 298,272
Bursa 164,981
Bastas 136,748
Nigde 83,155
Iskenderun 73,433
Baticim 62,409
Nuh 54,996
Lafarge Aslan 31,719
Konya 24,289
Anadolu 18,516
Eskisehir 14,145
Afyon 11,775
Ado 7,013
Total 3,526,888
21 cement plants25. The investigation concerned price fixing and market sharing
issues. The investigation committee defined the relevant product market as Portland
gray cement and blended Portland gray cement and the relevant geographic markets
25The plants were Adana, Ado, Afyon, Akc¸ansa, Anadolu, Bas¸tas¸, Batıc¸im, Bolu, Bursa, C¸imsa,
Denizli, Eskis¸ehir, Go¨ltas¸, Konya, Lafarge Aslan, Marmara, Nuh, Oysa I˙skenderun, Oysa Nigˇde,
Set, and Yibitas¸-Lafarge.
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as the Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean regions. The Competition
Board decided on February 2, 2002 and penalized 18 of the 21 cement companies
investigated26 Table 2.6 shows the monetary fines in dollars27.
2.4 The Econometric Model
The empirical analysis begins with the specification of a demand equation for
cement. Our demand specification is very simple:
Qt = α0 + α1Pt + α2TCEt + εt (2.1)
where t is a period in time, Qt is the quantity of cement shipped at time t, Pt
is the price of cement at time t, and TCEt is the total, housing plus non-housing
(infrastructure), construction expenditures at time t. Unlike some other studies,
e.g. [29], [30], and [31], we do not include the price of a substitute good for cement in
the demand specification. The reason is that there is no good substitute for cement
in Turkey. Steel and wood may be considered as substitutes for cement in housing
construction. But in Turkey almost all housing construction uses bricks or concrete
as the main ingredient and cement is used as the main product to bind bricks and
it is the main ingredient in concrete. Note that this is not the case in the U.S.
where, for instance, wood is used in many construction projects, which is almost
never the case in Turkey. As to non-housing construction28, only asphalt can be
considered as a feasible substitute for cement. But asphalt is used only in inter-city
road construction and thus constitutes a minor part of non-housing construction.
Although some construction projects may last longer than a year and this may
affect the future demand for cement, we do not include any lagged housing and/or
non-housing construction expenditures because they did not turn out to be statis-
26Namely, Adana, Ado, Afyon, Akc¸ansa, Anadolu, Bas¸tas¸, Batıc¸im, Bolu, Bursa, C¸imsa, Eskisehir,
Konya, Lafarge Aslan, Nuh, I˙skenderun, Nigˇde, Set, and Yibitas¸-Lafarge.
27One dollar was 1,386,051 TL in February 2002.
28Non-housing construction is basically composed of construction of roads, bridges, and dams.
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tically significant in our experiments with different demand specifications, which
implies that most of the projects are finished within a year. Also using total con-
struction expenditures instead of using housing and non-housing construction ex-
penditures separately conserves degrees of freedom without any significant changes
in the results for the demand estimation. Finally, we expect α1 to be negative and
α2 positive.
The specification of the supply side begins with the marginal revenue equation.
If the cement market is perfectly competitive, then the marginal revenue is equal to
price. But if there is imperfect competition in the cement market, then the perceived
marginal revenue is
MRt = Pt + λ
Qt
α1
where λ is the conduct parameter, which is is specified to be between zero and one.
For instance, if λ = 0, then the cement market is perfectly competitive. If it is one,
then a monopoly or perfect cartel applies. Cournot equilibrium has λ = 1/n if there
are n identical firms in the market.
Since the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue is the profit maximiza-
tion condition and is independent of market type, the next thing to do is to specify
the marginal cost equation for the cement industry. In cement production, we assume
that marginal cost depends only on input prices29:
MCt = c (PLt, PEt, PCt, PKt)
29The theoretical framework assumes that the firms are price-takers in input markets. The prices
of electricity, coal, and kraft paper are exogenous in the cement industry since they are either
produced by the state or imported. The only input price that cement firms may have control over
is labor. However, for years, Turkey has been applying a minimum-wage rule, which basically states
that it is illegal to employ workers under a certain wage level. The minimum-wage rule prevents
firms from enforcing their buyer powers.
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where PEt is the price of electricity, PCt is the price of coal, PLt is the price of
labor, and PKt is the price of kraft paper. Our MC specification, linear in input
prices30, is
MCt = β0 + β1PLt + β2PEt + β3PCt + β4PKt + δt
If we equate the marginal revenue and the marginal cost equations and arrange, we
get31
Pt = β0 + β1PLt + β2PEt + β3PCt + β4PKt − λ
(
Qt
α1
)
+ δt (2.2)
We are going to specify λ in such a way that it will let us capture the impact
of the competition policy introduction on the performance of the Turkish cement
industry. We have three different specifications32:
λ1t = λ
1
0
+ λ1
1
T + ε1t
λ2t = λ
2
0
+ λ2
2
D97 + ε2t
λ3t = λ
3
0
+ λ3
1
T + λ3
2
D97 + ε3t
where D97 is a dummy variable taking a value of 0 before 1997 and 1 after, and
including, 1997 since 1997 is the year that competition policy was effectively intro-
duced and T is a time trend33. We include the dummy variable to test whether
or not the introduction of competition policy had an immediate effect on market
performance. If λ2 turns out to be statistically insignificant, then we can conclude
that introduction of competition policy did not have a discrete impact on the cement
industry. We include the time trend to test whether the value of the market power
30Note that this implies a linear total cost function.
31Note that the conduct parameter, λ, is identified since the marginal cost function is constant
and the inverse demand function does not have the constant-elasticity property with respect to the
quantity of output. See [32], p. 99 for details.
32Similar specifications for the conduct parameter appear in [29], p. 395. and [30], p. 1004.
33Of course, it is a possibility that the conduct parameter might be a nonlinear function of time.
What we do here is to take a linear approximation.
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parameter decreases (λ1 < 0) or increases (λ1 > 0) over time. This specification will
also let us make some inferences. For instance, if both of the parameters turn out to
be statistically significant and λ2 < 0, then we can conclude that competition policy
has been effective at decreasing the market power in the cement industry over time.
Adding our most general conduct parameter specification for λt, the equation
becomes
Pt = β0 +β1PLt +β2PEt +β3PCt +β4PKt−
(
λ3
0
+ λ3
1
T + λ3
2
D97
)(Qt
α1
)
+ ξt (2.3)
where
ξt = δt −
(
Qt
α1
)
ε3t
and similarly for the other two specifications. Note that this introduces heteroscedas-
ticity into the model. We use nonlinear three-stage least-squares to estimate the
non-linear simultaneous equations system composed of equations 2.1 and 2.3.
2.5 Data
Our data set includes 9 variables and covers the 1986-2002 period. We have data
for the previous years but exclude them from our estimations since cement prices
were freely determined in the market only from the beginning of 1986. Table 3.1
presents some summary statistics of the data. All monetary series are deflated by
the consumer price index taking 1995 as the base year.
The endogenous variables are domestic cement sales (Q) and real cement prices
(P). Domestic cement sales are measured in million tons. Since the volume of imports
is very low throughout the period, cement sales include almost only domestically
produced cement. The table shows that domestic cement sales was around 27 million
tons on average between 1986 and 2002. The real cement prices are measured in
million Turkish Liras (TL). As the table shows, the real cement price was about 2.5
million TL on average.
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Table 2.7
Summary Statistics, 1986-2002 Annual Data
Series N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Endogenous variables
Q 17 27.184 4.323 18.935 34.127
P 17 2.511 0.432 1.827 3.082
Exogenous variables
TCE 17 1.004 0.145 0.703 1.186
PL 17 2.481 0.596 1.797 3.543
PE 17 3.973 0.588 3.169 5.383
PC 17 1.877 0.354 1.279 2.411
PK 17 33.333 8.034 23.043 47.131
TIME 17 9.000 5.050 1.000 17.000
D97 17 0.353 0.493 0.000 1.000
The exogenous variables are threefold: demand side variables, supply side vari-
ables, and generated variables. The only demand side exogenous variable is real
total construction expenditures (TCE) measured in trillion TL. The supply side ex-
ogenous variables are the prices of labor (PL), electricity (PE), coal (PC), and kraft
paper (PK). The price of labor is measured in hundred millions TL per year, the
price of electricity in thousand TL per kilowatt hour, the price of coal in million TL
per ton, and the price of kraft paper in million TL per ton. Appendix A includes a
detailed explanation of these variables.
The generated exogenous variables are time and the competition policy dummy
variable. The time variable is a sequence starting from 1 and ending in 17. The
dummy variable takes a value of zero before the introduction of competition policy
and one in and after 1997.
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2.6 Estimation and Results
In this section, we present our results. Our estimation technique is nonlinear
three-stage least-squares34. During the estimation process, we used all the exogenous
variables and their squares as the instruments (following [33], p. 440). Table 2.8
shows the estimation results for different system specifications.
The main purpose of model 1 is to estimate the market power in the cement
industry. Each variable is statistically significant at least at 5% level of significance.
The signs of the variables are as expected. On the demand side, we experimented
with once- and twice-lagged total construction expenditures but they never turned
out to be significant. It seems that most of the construction projects are finished
within a year. We also experimented with the price of asphalt, the price of a sub-
stitute good for cement. It also did not give statistically significant results, which
suggests that asphalt is a weak substitute for cement. Instead of including housing
and non-housing (infra-structure) construction expenditures separately, we decided
to include only total construction expenditures in order to conserve the degrees of
freedom. On the supply side, the results show that each of the inputs is significant
in cement production and has a significant contribution to the value of constant
marginal cost. The value of the conduct parameter shows that the cement industry
as a whole enjoyed some degree of market power over the sample period. In other
words, if we assume that the industry is composed of a single firm, this firm has
some degree of market power. Since the industry is composed of many firms, the
conduct parameter shows the average degree of market power over the firms35.
Model 2 looks at the change of the conduct parameter over time, keeping demand
and supply specifications the same. It assumes that the conduct parameter is a linear
function of time. The results indicate that the market power gradually decreased in
the cement industry over time. The coefficient of the time variable is statistically
34We use the PROC MODEL and PROC IML procedures in SAS for the estimations. The conver-
gence criteria is 1.e-7 and the numerical optimization method is Gauss-Newton.
35See [31], p. 53.
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Table 2.8
Four Different System Specifications
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demand Equation
a0 29.55841
a 29.75011a 29.66648a 29.85175a
a1 -8.74186
a -8.90474a -8.78243a -8.92043a
a2 19.50005
a 19.71653a 19.49387a 19.65452a
R2 0.8907 0.8911 0.8908 0.8911
R¯2 0.8794 0.8798 0.8795 0.8798
DW statistic 1.4752 1.4864 1.4751 1.4824
LM p-value 0.3046 0.3133 0.3067 0.3113
White 0.2545 0.2720 0.2571 0.2722
Supply Equation
b0 -3.33282
a -0.64412 -4.26603b -1.11172
b1 0.388307
a 0.314716a 0.470086a 0.361802a
b2 0.545606
a 0.321423a 0.625881a 0.361556b
b3 0.455198
b 0.212579 0.458549b 0.210154
b4 0.018327
a 0.008348 0.02699b 0.013615
λ 0.401183b - - -
λ0 - 0.244125
c 0.415295b 0.233402
λ1 - -0.01118
c - -0.01087c
λ2 - - 0.064412 0.037396
∂Pt/∂Qt 0.04589
b 0.01612 0.04988b 0.01668
R2 0.9164 0.9587 0.9237 0.9615
R¯2 0.8727 0.9305 0.8715 0.9276
DW statistic 2.3184 2.3148 2.4859 2.2033
LM p-value 0.0032 0.1502 0.0013 0.3854
White 0.3856 0.3856 0.3856 0.3856
a: significant at 1% using a Wald test
b: significant at 5% using a Wald test
c: significant at 10% using a Wald test
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significant at the 10% significance level. A natural question here is whether the
introduction of the competition policy had something to do with the fact that the
market power gradually decreased 1986 through 2002.
Model 3 assumes that the conduct parameter is a linear function of a dummy
variable which takes a value of zero before 1997 and a value of 1 after and including
1997. The results are surprising. We find that the introduction of competition policy
had no effect on the market power in the cement industry since the coefficient of the
dummy variable is not statistically different from zero. The estimation of λ0 shows
that the market power before the introduction of competition policy was around
0.415. The introduction of competition policy seems to have a positive effect on the
degree of market power. However, the λ2 coefficient is not statistically different from
zero. So we conclude that competition policy had no effect in the cement industry.
Since the other parameters are approximately the same as in Models 1 and 2, the
specification seems to be robust.
Finally, Model 4 assumes that the conduct parameter is a function of both time
and the dummy variable. This formulation will let us look at the immediate effects of
the introduction of competition policy in a better way since the time variable controls
for the change in the market power over time. The results corroborate our earlier
findings. The coefficient of the dummy variable is still not statistically different from
zero, which once again shows that the introduction of competition policy had no
apparent effect on the market performance of the cement industry. On the other
hand, the coefficient of the time variable is still negative and statistically significant
at the same degree, showing once more that the market power gradually decreased
for the time interval between 1986 and 2002.
The fit measures R2 and R¯2 are very high for both demand and supply equations
for every model, showing that our specifications fit the data very well. The LM p-
value rows show the p-values of the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation in
the error terms and the DW statistic rows show the Durbin-Watson test statistics for
the same purpose. The demand equation is free of serial correlation as both the LM
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test and the DW test show. The supply equation is also free of serial correlation when
the specification includes a time trend, which is model 2 and model 4. We get mixed
results for models 1 and 3. The LM test shows the existence of serial correlation in
these models. However, the DW test statistic for these models fall into the no serial
correlation area. Since the LM test is basically a large sample test, we prefer the DW
test and conclude that we cannot clearly accept the existence of serial correlation
in the specifications 1 and 3. We also use White’s test for heteroscedasticity in the
error terms and accept the null hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity.
To test the robustness of the results, we also experimented with another dummy
variable in models 3 and 4, which takes a value of zero before 1998 and 1 after and
including 1998, assuming any potential impact of the introduction of competition
policy showed itself with a lag. The results are qualitatively the same, although
quantitatively different. In model 3, the coefficient of the competition policy dummy
is negative this time but still insignificant. In model 4, the time variable is again
negative and significant at a 10% significance level. The dummy variable is also
negative but still insignificant. This may imply that the impact of the introduction
of competition policy may be starting in time since the sign of its coefficient changed
from positive in 1997 to negative in 1998. It would be interesting to experiment
with other dummy variables, but with the current data set, these experiments would
not be meaningful. We also experimented with dummies for the external shocks
mentioned in the third section but none of them produced statistically meaningful
results.
The slope of the demand curve is negative as expected and statistically significant
for each model. The sign of the partial derivative of the demand equation with
respect to the current total construction expenditures is positive as expected and
also statistically significant for each model. The results show that our demand
specification is very robust.
As to the supply equation, models 1 and 3 exhibit good results. The effects of
the labor, electricity, coal, and kraft prices on the equilibrium price of cement are
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Table 2.9
Market Power Measures
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Conduct Parameter 0.40118 0.14354 0.43803 0.14878
(0.0403) (0.7315) (0.0472) (0.6521)
Price-Cost Margin 1.24751 0.43819 1.35580 0.45338
(0.0362) (0.7333) (0.0427) (0.6518)
Lerner Index 0.49680 0.17450 0.53992 0.18055
(0.0362) (0.7333) (0.0427) (0.6518)
Wald test p-values are in parentheses
always positive, as expected, and statistically significant. The partial derivatives of
the supply equation with respect to output are positive and significant.
Table 2.9 shows various market power measures. Price-cost margin is the differ-
ence between price and marginal cost and the Lerner index is the price-cost margin
divided by the price. Each market power measure is evaluated at the sample means
for each model. Model 1 and 3 show that the market power in the cement industry is
around 0.40-0.44. Since the introduction of the competition policy does not produce
statistically significant results, we do not attempt to measure the degree of market
power before and after it. The price cost margin shows that the real price over the
sample period was around 1.2-1.4 million TL above the constant marginal cost with
1995 prices.
Models 2 and 4 involve the time variable and it seems that it distorts the results
of the supply equations. That’s why we do not interpret them. When we assumed
that the degree of market power is a linear function of time, we did not assume that
a causality relation between them exists. We wanted to see if there is a time trend in
the market power and if there was, how our results would change if we accounted for
it. The results showed that there is a slight decrease in the degree of market power.
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However, the relation is not too strong since the coefficient of the time variable was
significant only at a 10% level. Model 4 showed that accounting for the slight time
trend did not change our results at all.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we tried to evaluate the impact of the introduction of competition
policy on the performance of the Turkish cement industry. Based on our results,
we can conclude that the cement industry has gradually become more competitive
over time since the sign of the parameter of the time trend in our supply equation
is negative and the parameter itself, although small in absolute value, is statistically
significant. The Competition Authority dummy turned out to be statistically in-
significant even when we assume that it might have a lagged impact. These results
are contrary to our initial expectations and show that the introduction of compe-
tition policy has not made the cement industry more competitive despite all the
investigations and monetary penalties. However, they are consistent with the find-
ing in another study that the competition policy implementation in Turkey has faced
serious obstacles36. On the other hand, these results may change over time. The
impact of competition policy may show itself in the data in the coming years.
Our method to assess the introduction of competition policy is a general one. It
can be applied in other settings. A natural extension of the method is to use plant-
level data, to delineate appropriate geographical markets, and to measure market
power in each of them. That is left for the future research.
36See [25].
APPENDIX
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APPENDIX A
DATA
This appendix explains the data set we use in the text in more detail. The following
is a detailed discussion of the data we use.
Domestic Cement Sales (Qt): Total domestic cement sales were obtained from
the annual reports of the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
Price of Cement (PCt): Annual prices of cement per ton are obtained from the
State Institute of Statistics, Turkey.
Total Construction Expenditures (TCEt): Annual total construction expendi-
tures at 1995 prices in billions of Turkish Liras are obtained from SourceOECD
Databases, Annual National Accounts, Main Aggregates, GDP: Expenditure Ap-
proach. It is composed of housing construction expenditures (HCEt) plus non-
housing construction expenditures (NCEt), that is, infrastructure expenditures.
Price of Coal (PCt): Annual average steam coal prices per tonne for industry in
1000 Turkish Liras are obtained from International Energy Agency (IEA) Statistics,
Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues. These prices include value added tax. We
remove inflationary effects in the series by using wholesale (producer) price index.
Price of Electricity (PEt): Annual average electricity prices per kilowatt hour for
the industrial sector in 1000 Turkish Liras are obtained from International Energy
Agency (IEA) Statistics, Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues. These prices
include excise tax and value added tax. We remove inflationary effects in these
prices by using wholesale (producer) price index.
Price of Labor (PLt): Annual average amount of wages and salaries per employee
in manufacturing sector in billion liras are obtained by dividing the total wages and
salaries paid to employees by the number of employees for the corresponding year.
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The source is The Growth of World Industry, Volume I, Core Data, Yearbook of
Industrial Statistics, Volume I, Core Data, Industrial Statistics Yearbook, Volume
I, Core Statistics, all United Nations (UN) publications, UN Statistical Yearbook
database, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), various issues. Unfortunately, the series stop
at 1997. After 1997, the series is updated by using a earning index per employee
in manufacturing sector which takes 1997 as the base year and is published by the
State Institute of Statistics, Turkey. We remove inflationary effects in these prices
by using wholesale (producer) price index.
Price of Kraft Paper (PKt): Kraft paper prices were obtained from the State
Institute of Statistics.
Consumer Price Index (CPIt): Consumer price index numbers are obtained from
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database which takes 1995 as the base year.
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APPENDIX B
THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE LAW
The following are Articles 4, 5, 6, and, 7 of the Law on the Protection of Competition,
No. 4054, which are included in Part II, Chapter One, Prohibited Practices. Article
4 takes place under the heading Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions
Restricting Competition.
Article 4 - Agreements and concerted practices of the enterprises and decisions
and practices of the associations of enterprises the object or effect or the possible
impact of which is, directly or indirectly, to prevent, distort or restrict competition
in a certain market for goods and services, are unlawful and prohibited.
Such practices are, in particular, as follows:
a. To fix purchase or sales prices or the factors such as cost or profit which form the
price or all other trading conditions concerning purchase and sales of goods
and services;
b. To share the markets for goods and services or to share or control the market
sources and components;
c. To control or to determine the quantities of supply or demand in the markets for
goods and services outside the market conditions;
d. To impede or restrict the activities of the competitors or to eliminate other enter-
prises operating in the market by boycotts or by other practices or to prevent
the newcomers in the market;
e. Except exclusive dealing agreements, to apply dissimilar conditions to persons
which have equivalent transactions with equal rights and obligations;
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f. Contrary to the nature of the agreement or to the commercial customary rules,
to make the conclusion of contracts subject to the purchase of other goods
and services or acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display of other
goods and services or acceptance of resale conditions for the goods or services
concerned.
In cases where the existence of an agreement cannot be proved, if the price
changes or the balance of supply and demand or the areas of activity in the markets
of the enterprises concerned are similar to those of the markets where competition is
prevented, distorted or restricted, this constitutes a presumption that the enterprises
concerned are engaged in a concerted practice.
Each such party thereto, may avoid liability if the contrary is proven on economic
and rational grounds.
Article 5 - The Board, in the existence of all the conditions stated below and
upon the application of the parties concerned, may declare the provisions of Article 4
inapplicable to any agreement or concerted practice between enterprises or decision
by associations of enterprises which:
a. Contributes to new developments and progress or technical or economic improve-
ment in production or distribution of goods and in providing services;
b. Allows consumers to get a share from the resulting benefit;
and which does not:
c. Eliminate competition in a substantial part of the relevant market;
d. Induce a restraint on competition that is more than essential for the attainment
of the objectives set out in paragraphs (a) and (b);
A decision for exemption shall be issued for a specified period of not more than
five years. Certain conditions and/or obligations may be attached to an exemption
decision. Upon the termination of the specified period of exemption, the decision
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for exemption may, upon the application of the parties concerned, be renewed if the
requirements for exemption continue to be satisfied.
In cases where the requirements stated in the first paragraph are satisfied, the
Board may issue communiqus by which certain categories of agreements shall be
exempted as a group and the conditions attached thereto are shown.
Article 6 - Any abuse, by one or more enterprises acting alone or by means of
agreements or practices, of a dominant position in a market for goods and services
within the whole or part of the territory of the State, is unlawful and prohibited.
Abusive practices are, in particular, as follows:
a. To prevent, directly or indirectly, other enterprises in its area of commercial
activities or practices which aim to impede the activities of the competitors in
the market;
b. To make discrimination, directly or indirectly, by way of imposing dissimilar
conditions for equivalent and same rights and obligations to the purchasers
who have equivalent position;
c. To make the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance of restrictions
concerning resale conditions such as the purchase of other goods and services or
acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display other goods and services
or maintenance of a minimum resale price;
d. Practices which aim to distort competition in a market for goods and services by
means of taking financial, technological and commercial advantages created by
the dominant position in another market;
e. To restrict production, marketing or technical development thereby causing a
disadvantage for the consumers.
Article 7 - Merger of two or more enterprises and acquisition, except acquisition
by way of inheritance, by an enterprise or by a person, of another enterprise, either
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by acquisition of all or part of its assets or securities or other means by which that
person or enterprise acquires a controlling power in that enterprise concerned, which
creates or strengthens the dominant position of one or more enterprises as a result
of which, competition is significantly impeded in the market for goods and services
in the whole or part of the territory of the State, is unlawful and prohibited.
The Board, shall issue communiqus to announce the categories of mergers and
acquisitions which, to be considered as legally valid, require a permission by prior
notification to the Board.
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